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eliminate. 67 In addition, development of means of private enforcement of
68
section 16(a) would add substance to an otherwise skeletal prohibition.
Since knowledge as to who controls the corporation is important to an
investor,"8 and one injured because of a breach of section 16(a) has no7
70
other effective remedy, the purposes of the Securities Exchange Act "
would best be served by permitting a civil remedy for a section 16(a)
violation .72
JAMES

A.

PHILPO-r, JR.

THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT OF 1964DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO AN INDEPENDENT
PSYCHIATRIC EXAMINATION
Indigent defendants, accused of federal crimes, may qualify for expert
services under the Criminal Justice Act of 1964.' Under section 3006A(e)
of the Act, it is within the trial court's discretion to authorize at
government expense an independent psychiatric examination of an
indigent defendant when such expert knowledge is necessary to adequately
prepare his defense. 2 In addition, where there is doubt as to the
defendant's competency to stand trial, a federal district court may order a
psychiatric examination pursuant to section 4244 of Title 18 of the United
States Code. 3 However, when a defendant requests a section 3006A(e)
"See Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953).
"Note 33 and accompanying text supra.
"See note 64 and accompanying text supra.
"Notes 15-19 and accompanying text supra.
"Notes 2-4 and accompanying text supra.
"See Chicago S.S. & S.B. R.R. v. Monon R.R., C.C.H. FED. SEC. L. REP.
1965).
(N.D. Ill.

91,525

118 U.S.C. § 3006A (1964), as amended 18 U.S.C.A. § 3006A (Supp. 1971).
218 U.S.C.§ 3006A(e) (1964), as amended 18 U.S.C.A. § 3006A(e) (1) (Supp. 1971) is
as follows:
(e) Services other than counsel.(I) Upon request.--Counsel for a person who is financially unable to
obtain investigative, expert, or other services necessary for an adequate
defense may request them in an ex parte application. Upon finding, after
appropriate inquiry in an ex parte proceeding, that the services are
necessary and that the person is financially unable to obtain them, the
court, or the United States magistrate . . . shall authorize counsel to
obtain the services.
3Section 4244 requires the United States Attorney to file a motion for a defendant to be
psychiatrically examined when he has "reasonable cause" to believe the defendant, after
arrest and before sentencing, "may be presently insane or otherwise so mentally incompetent
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psychiatric examination, subsequent to being held competent to stand
trial on the basis of a section 4244 examination, the question arises as to
whether a court may view the section 3006A(e) examination as being
unnecessary or repetitive.
In -the recent case of United States v. Maret,4 an indigent defendant
had been convicted of assaulting a superintendent of the mails with intent
to commit armed robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 2114.5 The
facts reveal that several days after his arrest, upon a motion of the United
States Attorney, Maret was ordered to have a psychiatric examination
pursuant to section 4244. The examination, which was conducted by
government psychiatrists, indicated that he was competent to stand trial.
Over three years after the offense,' defense counsel filed a motion7 for
another psychiatric examination which was granted. The district court
judge ordered the government examination to determine the defendant's
competency to stand trial and his competency at the time of the offense.
as to be unable to understand the proceedings against him or properly to assist in his own
defense." Also, the defendant may make a similar motion or the court may initiate the
examination itself. If the examination reveals a present state of insanity, the court shall hold
a hearing to determine the mental condition of the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1964).
'433 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1970).
518 U.S.C. § 2214 (1964), provides that it is a federal crime for a person to assault a
government employee with intent to rob the mails. Maret's behavior in committing the crime
was bizarre. Upon entering the post office he demanded to see the provost marshal. Instead,
he was taken to the superintendent's office where he made everyone lie on the floor while he
fired five random shots across the room. He also made the superintendent phone the F.B.I.
and then greeted the agent with, "Hi, you, Pop, how are you doing?" He continued on the
phone until arrested. 433 F.2d at 1066, 1071.
'After being held competent to stand trial on the basis of the first examination, Maret
pleaded guilty and received the mandatory twenty-five year sentence. Apparently after
serving part of the sentence, he was allowed to change his plea to not guilty, thus accounting
for the lapse of three years between the first and second examinations. The appellate decision
indicates that Maret had different counsel when he originally pleaded guilty than when he
later pleaded not guilty. 433 F.2d at 1066-67.
7
Correspondence with defendant's counsel states that this motion for an independent
psychiatric examination was made under section 4244 and requested a determination both of
competency to stand trial and of criminal responsibility. On appeal the part of the motion
requesting a determination of criminal responsibility was treated as being requested under
section 3006A(e) since the services sought by defense counsel were more appropriately
considered under the latter subsection. Letter from Thomas W. Flynn, Jr. to the Washington
andLee Law Review, April 2, 197 1, on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review.
The dissent in Maret indicates defense counsel's original motion for an independent
examination and a statement that defendant's counsel made to the district court concerning
the purpose of examination were both made in terms properly considered under section
3006A(e). 433 F.2d at 1072 n.3. The fact that the majority considered section 3006A(e) and
its criteria in rejecting Maret's appeal on the motion for psychiatric services would indicate
that his originally requesting the motion under section 4244 did not bar the granting of the
motion under section 3006A(e). 433 F.2d at 1068-69.
'433 F.2d at 1067, 1071.
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This second examination apparently only indicated that Maret was

competent to stand trial.9 The defense counsel then renewed'0 his motion
for an independent psychiatrist to be appointed at government expense for
the purpose of determining the soundness of a defense of incompetency at
the time of the offense." The motion was made in light of several
2
indications that Maret had suffered from a mental disorder.'

Nevertheless, the motion was denied, and at his trial Maret was found
guilty and a mandatory twenty-five year sentence was imposed.

On appeal, Maret claimed that the district court had erred in its denial
of his motion for an independent psychiatric examination." The Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that pretrial motions for an
'The majority and dissent differ as to what the second examination report indicated. The
majority stated that the second examination ordered by the district court was "to include
determination of his competency at the time of the criminal offense. . ." 433 F.2d at 1067.
By inference and the context of the statement, the rest of the order must have included a
determination of his competency to stand trial since it was granted under section 4244. Notes
3 and 7 supra. The majority further stated that the second examination reaffirmed the
diagnosis of the first examination, and that it "supported an adjudication of competency."
433 F.2d at 1067. Whether the competency referred to was competency to stand trial or
competency at the time of the offense is not clear. It is clear, however, that the diagnosis in
the first examination was in regard to the defendant's competency to stand trial. 433 F.2d at
1067. It is also well recognized that a trial judge's determination can only concern a
defendant's competency to stand trial, since competency at the time of the offense is a jury
question. See Hurt v. United States, 327 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1964); Davis v. United States,
160 U.S. 469 (1895). Therefore, there seems to be a serious doubt that the second
examination resulted in a determination of Maret's competency at the time of the offense. In
fact, the dissenting judge found that the second examination was conducted only to
determine competency to stand trial. 433 F.2d at 1072. The dissent quoted the second report
to the effect that the defendant was "ready to return to court" and that the examination
would "support an adjudication of competency." 433 F.2d at 1072. Therefore, upon the
basis of statements by the majority and the dissent's quotation from the second examination
report, it is concluded that the second examination report did not determine the defendant's
competency at the time of the offense.
"0When the defendant was granted the second section 4244 examination, his motion had
requested, in part, an independent psychiatric examination which was not granted. 433 F.2d
at 1072 n.3 (dissenting opinion); note 7 supra.
"433 F.2d at 1072 n.3 (dissenting opinion).
"When Maret was in the Army, he was examined by a psychiatrist and found to have a
soiopathic personality disturbance, anti-social type, characterized by poor judgment and
impulse control, emotional immaturity, and the seeking of personal gratifications on a
hedonistic level."' While in federal custody he required mental examination and treatment
for a "'behavior problem and aggressiveness toward other inmates"' and previously had
been isolated to prevent the possibility of his committing suicide. 433 F.2d at 1072
(dissenting opinion). See note 5supra for a description of Maret's behavior at the time of the
offense.
13
Maret also appealed on the basis that there was an insufficiency of evidence as to his
intent to rob the post office and that statements he made before being properly advised of his
legal rights were improperly admitted at the trial. These contentions were rejected
summarily. 433 F.2d at 1066.
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independent psychiatric examination concerning criminal responsibility
were premature and unauthorized by Congress, unless the defendant had
already pleaded insanity as a defense or the section 4244 report or other
facts before the court indicated that the defendant was insane. The court
also indicated that "[r]epeated mental examinations" were within the
discretion of the trial court to grant and were not required by section
4244.2 The dissent felt that a recent Eighth Circuit case' 5 applying section
3006A(e) was controlling. It concluded that since the defendant was
indigent and had demonstrated a need for psychiatric examination to
prepare an adequate defense, the examination should have been permitted
pursuant to section 3006A(e) despite the results of the prior 4244
examination.
The Maret decision places hard limitations on the Eighth Circuit
holding in United States v. Schultz, 6 and seems to substantially narrow
the situations to which that case may be applied. Schultz was the first
decision to clearly acknowledge that when an indigent defendant in a
federal criminal proceeding shows that the expert knowledge of a
psychiatrist is necessary to enable defense counsel to pursue and develop
the defense of a lack of criminal responsibility, an independent psychiatric
examination at government expense should be granted under section
3006A(e).' 7 The Schultz court held that a motion for such services is to be
evaluated upon a reasonableness standard and that a trial court should
not deny a motion for those services "when underlying facts reasonably
suggest that further exploration may prove beneficial to the accused in the
development of a defense to the charge."'
The court in Schultz did not state specifically what factors were to be
considered in determining whether the reasonableness standard had been
met. 9 It did indicate, however, that the discretion of trial courts regarding
11433 F.2d at 1067.

"5United States v. Schultz, 431 F.2d 907 (8th Cir. 1970).
"-431 F.2d 907 (8th Cir. 1970).
7
Although Schultz was the first case to specifically reach this conclusion, several cases
in the same general area preceded it. E.g., Hall v. United States, 410 F.2d 653 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 970 (1969) (competency at the time of sentencing); Christian v. United
States, 398 F.2d 517 (10th Cir. 1968) (delay in granting 3006A(e) psychiatric examinations);
United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1968) (3006A(e) and foreclosing
government examination of defendants); Alexander v. United States, 380 F.2d 33 (8th Cir.
1967) (independent examination of defendants); Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710 (8th
Cir. 1967), vacated, 392 U.S. 651 (1968) (FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(b), independent psychiatrists,
and foreclosing government examinations of defendants); Bush v. McCollum, 231 F. Supp.
560 (N.D. Tex. 1964) (adequacy of psychiatric examinations and indigency).
'4431 F.2d at 911.
17lhe circuit court held that hospitalization as a mental patient, diagnosis as a manic
depressive, and the bizarre behavior of Schultz, who had pleaded insanity, were sufficient
indications to meet the reasonableness standard in the Schultz case. 431 F.2d at 911-12.
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section 3006A(e) should be exercised in a manner more favorable to an
accused than the discretion of trial courts under Rule 17(b) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. The broad discretion under Rule 17(b)

operates to minimize the number of 17(b) motions the court will grant,"0
whereas the Schultz court indicated that a greater proportion of section
3006A(e) motions should be allowed. Furthermore, the circuit court noted
that the defendant had been declared competent to stand trial on the basis
of a section 4244 examination before his motion for an independent
psychiatric examination was made. 21 In reviewing this element of the case,

the court stated that an examination to determine competency to stand
trial may be insufficient to indicate a defendant's competency at the time
of the offense. 22 An examination which is adequate to determine
competency to stand trial may not be of the depth and detail necessary to

determine the more subtle question as to whether or not a defendant was23
mentally capable of possessing the requisite intent to commit the crime.
Under section 4244, technically only an examination to determine the
defendant's competency to stand trial is authorized. 2' Federal judges,
however, do have the inherent power to order an examination to determine

criminal responsibility,25 and while such a determination is not specifically
wrlhe court in Shultz appeared to be referring to the situation in the past where the
federal courts have exercised broad discretion under Rule 17(b) as a means to effect a general
policy of granting only a minimal number of motions allowing a defendant to subpoena
witnesses at government expense. Prior to the 1966 amendment of Rule 17(b), an affidavit
was required stating that the testimony of such witnesses was crucial to the defense of the
case. Such an affidavit, which was a matter of public record, had the effect of prematurely
disclosing the theory of the defense which was a reason why it was seldom used. Congress
removed this requirement in order to bring Rule 17(b) more in line with the Criminal Justice
Act.

SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,

90TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
COURTS 216-17 (Comm. Print 1969).
21431 F.2d at 908.

ACT

IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT

2431 F.2d at 912; note 23 and accompanying text infra.
"See generally United States v. Driscoll, 399 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1968); Winn v. United
States, 270 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 848 (1961); Williams v. United
States, 250 F.2d 19 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 841 (1963); Blunt v. United
States, 244 F.2d 355, 364 n.23 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
2418 U.S.C. § 4244 (1964), reads in part as follows:
Whenever after arrest and prior to the imposition of sentence. . . the
United States Attorney has reasonable cause to believe that a person...
may be presently insane or otherwise so mentally incompetent as to be
unable to understand the proceedings against him or properly to assist in
his own defense, he shall file a motion [for a psychiatric examination to
determine the validity of that belief].
"See United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719, 722-23 (4th Cir. 1968). The court in
Aibright stated: "Among the authorities, both state and federal, only State v. Olson, 274
Minn. 225, 143 N.W.2d 69 (1966), holds that, absent an enabling statute having specific
application, a court lacks inherent power to require a defendant to submit to a psychiatric
examination." 388 F.2d at 723.
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provided for under section 4244, court orders granting an examination for
criminal responsibility pursuant to that section have not been successfully
2

attacked. 1
The difference in the two types of mental examinations is the natural
result of the two separate insanity defenses which the examinations are

designed to explore. The defense of incompetency to stand trial is based on
the policy that incompetent defendants cannot understand criminal
proceedings and consequently may be unable to bring to light pertinent
information for the purposes of their defense.2 7 The defense of
incompetency at the time of the offense is based upon the policy that the

law ought not to punish a person who is so mentally deranged as to be
unable to know he is committing a crime or who is unable to prevent

himself from committing the crime.Y8
Unlike a federal district court's discretion in granting motions for
independent psychiatric examination under section 3006A(e), the court's
discretion in granting motions to examine defendants concerning their
29
competency to stand trial is relatively well defined and narrow in scope.
Under section 4244 the trial court must grant such motions when there is
"reasonable cause" to believe the defendant is incompetent. 0 This
concept of reasonable cause, as used in cases concerning psychiatric
examinations to determine competency to stand trial, has been construed
to mean some showing of good faith beyond a mere allegation of
incompetency. 3' Seemingly the defendant only has to show a reasonable
likelihood that he may be incompetent to stand trial, not a strong
32
probability of such incompetency.
2

The practice of including a determination of criminal responsibility in an order for a
section 4244 examination has been questioned unsuccessfully in several cases. See United
States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1968); Alexander v. United States, 380 F.2d 33
(8th Cir. 1967); cf. Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1967), vacated, 392 U.S.
651 (1968); Winn v. United States, 270 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 848
(1961); Williams v. United States, 250 F.2d 19, 24 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 374 U.S.
841 (1963).
ZTSee Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966); Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S.
402,403 (1960); Bishop v. United States, 350 U.S. 961 (1956); Swinney v. United States, 422
F.2d 1257 (1970); United States v. Collier, 399 F.2d 705 (7th Cir. 1968); Blunt v. United
States, 389 F.2d 545 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
zSee Blake v. United States, 407 F.2d 908 (1969), interpretingDavis v. United States,
165 U.S. 373 (1897).
2'See Ruud v. United States, 347 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1014
(1966).
-"Once a showing of reasonable cause has been made, section 4244 states: "[T]he court
shall cause the accused .
to be examined as to his mental condition .
18 U.S.C.
§ 4244 (1964).
3
'Kelly v. United States, 221 F.2d 822 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Mirra v. United States, 255 F.
Supp. 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), affd, 379 F.2d 782 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1022
(1967).
32
See Birdwell v. United States, 345 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1965); Meador v. United States,
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An important consideration of the trial court regarding a motion for a
psychiatric examination is whether the defendant has been previously
examined as to his mental competency. In this respect, the threshold
question which arises is whether the subsequent motion is based upon a
defense of incompetency to stand trial or incompetency at the time of the
offense. Once the basis of the motion is established, the next question is,
did the previous examination concern the same type of incompetency that
the motion presently before the court seeks to determine? At this stage
33
cburts may become confused as to what type of motion has been made,
what standard should be used to rule upon the motion, or whether the
motion is merely another request for an examination which has already
been granted.
With respect to the right to repeated examinations, there is no federal
statute which provides guidance, and case law only refers to reexaminations under section 4244 as it is applied to examinations which
determine competency to stand trial.3 ' Where both the initial and
subsequent examinations are requested for reasons other than to
determine competency to stand trial under section 4244, the guidelines
used to determine if the subsequent motion should be granted are unclear
at best. If the first examination at the government's request under section
4244 is made to determine both the defendant's competency to stand trial
and competency at the time of the offense,3 a subsequent request by the
defendant for an independent examination pursuant to section 3006A(e)
for aid in the preparation of a defense of insanity at the time of the offense
332 F.2d 935 (9th Cir. 1964); Lewelling v. United States, 320 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1963);
Caster v. United States, 319 F.2d 850 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 953 (1964).
3rhe following motions would appear to be appropriate when seeking judicial approval
for a psychiatric examination: (a) motion by the government for an examination to
determine defendant's competency to stand trial; (b) motion by the government for an
examination to determine defendant's competency at the time of the offense; (c) motion by
the government combining (a) and (b); (d) motion by defendant for a government
examination to determine defendant's competency to stand trial; (e) motion by defendant for
a government examination to determine his competency at the time of the offense; (f) motion
by defendant combining (d) and (e); (g) motion by the defendant for an independent
psychiatric examination to determine his competency at the time of the offense; (h) selfinitiated order by the court for an examination to determine defendant's competency to
stand trial; (i) self-initiated order by the court for an examination to determine defendant's
competency at the time of the offense; (j) self-initiated order by the court combining (h) and
(i).
'E.g., Hall v. United States, 410 F.2d 653 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 970 (1969);
United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1968); Crawn v. United States, 254 F.
Supp. 669 (M.D. Pa. 1966).
3The situation is further complicated when an examination is ordered to determine both
competency to stand trial and competency at the time of the offense, and the examination
report indicates the defendant's competency as to only one of the purposes for which the
examination was ordered. Such was the situation in both Maret and Schultz.
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could be treated by the court as a repeat examination. However, it could
also be treated as an original request under section 3006A(e) of the
Criminal Justice Act, which was enacted for the benefit of the defendant
and, therefore, unrelated to any previous government examination. In a
leading case discussing the right to repeated examinations, Hall v. United
States3 1 an initial psychiatric examination concerning the defendant's
criminal responsibility was used to indicate the defendant's competency to
stand trial and be sentenced. The Fourth Circuit stated that section 4244
presupposes that no previous psychiatric examination has been made
recently enough to aid the court in its determination of the competency of
the defendant." The court implied from this that continued examinations
were unnecessary.38

In a situation somewhat converse to that in Maret, where the
defendant has already undergone an examination by his own psychiatrist
and raises the defense of insanity, courts have not hesitated to grant

government motions for a separate examination to aid in the prosecution
of the accused. 39 This situation, however, is not completely analogous to
the one in which the government has previously conducted an examination
and the defense request is for an independent examination pursuant to

section 3006A(e). The principal difference is that if the prosecution were
denied a psychiatric examination of the defendant, it would still have the

burden of proof on the issue of criminal responsibility." Without a
psychiatric report, the prosecution would be at a greater disadvantage

than the defendant who only has to show a reasonable doubt as to his
competency in order to be acquitted. 41 The Eighth Circuit in Pope v.
United States4" has stated that when the government has paid for

psychiatric examinations and has the burden of proving the defendant
-3410 F.2d 653 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 970 (1969).
37
1d. at 658.
3"Hall dealt with the competency of the defendant at the time of sentencing rather than
during the actual trial. The appellate court held that since the trial judge had heard extensive
testimony concerning the defendant's criminal responsibility by three psychiatrists at trial,
he was sufficiently aware of the defendant's mental condition so as not to require an
additional examination for any given day the defendant claimed to be incompetent in order
to forestall sentencing. Only one month had lapsed between the completion of the trial and
sentencing. 410 F.2d at 656.
3
1E.g., United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1968); Alexander v. United
States, 380 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1967); Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1967),
vacated,392 U.S. 651 (1968).
"See Hurt v. United States, 327 F.2d 978, 981 (8th Cir. 1964). In Hurt, the Eighth
Circuit relied upon the case of Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 486-87 (1895), in which
the Supreme Court explained the general presumption of a defendant's sanity and what is
necessary to rebut the presumption.
"1See Hurt v. United States, 327 F.2d 978, 981 (8th Cir. 1964), interpreting Davis v.
United States, 160 U.S. 469, 486-87 (1895).
4372 F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1967), vacated, 392 U.S. 651 (1968).
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sane, it would be a "strange situation" where the government could be
denied its own corresponding examination, "a step which, perhaps is the
'43
most trustworthy means of attempting to meet that burden."
Accordingly, it would seem equally strange for a court to recognize the
degree of expertise necessary to prepare the prosecution's argument
concerning insanity, yet not to recognize it in regard to the defense's
preparation on the same issue.
In addition to Schultz, the circuit courts in United States v. Albright"
ind Alexander v. United States" have indicated that when the government
has reason to question the competency of the accused to stand trial, it
should be allowed to examine the defendant for that purpose." Similarly,
when the defendant needs a psychiatrist to aid in the preparation of his
defense, the granting of such a motion would be appropriate. 47 In
addition, if the defendant, after being examined by his own psychiatrist,
shows that his defense will include incompetency at the time of the offense,
the government should be entitled to further examine the defendant in
order to meet its burden of proof."' It appears that the courts regard each
type of psychiatric examination as being equally important to the side
requesting it, and that each should be granted for a separate purpose. The
granting of one psychiatric examination was not dependent upon whether
a previous examination had been granted for a different purpose.
The inference drawn from the Albright and Alexander cases is
consistent with the legislative intent behind the Criminal Justice Act of
1964, which was enacted to insure the equal protection of indigent
defendants accused of federal crimes. 49 The inclusion of section 3006A(e)
in the Act was a recognition of the fact that appointed counsel may lack
the necessary skill and expertise in certain specialized or technical fields to
evaluate and prepare a defense properly, and that in the interest of justice,
43d.at 720.

"388 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1968). In Albright, the defendant, after an examination by his
own psychiatrist, surprised the prosecution at trial by raising the defense of a lack of
criminal responsibility. The court adjourned the trial for twenty-three days to allow the
defendant to be examined by the government, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed this action.
"380 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1967). In Alexander, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district
court, which had allowed the government a further examination of the defendant after he
revealed his intention of posing a defense of incompetency at the time of the offense, even
though the government had previously examined the defendant under section 4244.
"Both cases cited section 4244 as authorizing the government to require that defendants
be examined as to their mental competency to stand trial. 388 F.2d at 722; 380 F.2d at 38.
17388 F.2d at 722-23; 380 F.2d at 38.
"In Alexander, the court held that it would "violate judicial common sense to permit a
defendant to invoke the defense of insanity and foreclose the Government from the benefit of
a mental examination to meet this issue." 380 F.2d at 39.

4"See preamble, 78 Stat. 552 (1964).
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the federal government will pay the expenses involved in obtaining the
necessary experts.50
The intent of Congress to make expert services, such as independent
psychiatric examinations, readily available is further evidenced by the
1970 amendment to the Criminal Justice Act. 51 It provides that United
States magistrates, as well as federal district court judges, may authorize
section 3006A(e) services. 52 The amended Act also makes it much easier to
qualify for reimbursement where the expert services necessary for an
adequate defense are obtained without prior authorization. 3 These new
provisions are designed to make expert services more available during the
pretrial period and to remove procedural difficulties in obtaining the
necessary servicesA' In addition, the Act now provides funds in excess of
"S. REP. No. 346, 88TH CONG., IST SEss. 68 (1963); H.R. REP. No. 864, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1-12 (1963). The Attorney General of the United States, Robert F. Kennedy, in
testifying before the Senate and House Committees on the Judiciary prior to the passage of
the Act, emphasized the serious prejudice that defendants in federal criminal cases had
suffered as a result of their indigency, even though they were represented by appointed
counsel. S. REP. No. 346 at 68; H.R. REP. No. 864 at 5-8. Senator Hruska stated that
section 3006A(e) was the most remarkable provision of the Criminal Justice Act in that it
provided for expert services when the mere presence of a lawyer was not enough to achieve an
adequate representation. See 110 CONG. REc. 18521 (1964).
5118 U.S.C.A. § 3006A(e) (Supp. 1971). This amendment was enacted October 14,
1970, twelve days prior to the decision in Maret v. United States. All cases cited which
discuss the Criminal Justice Act were concerned with the language of the Act prior to its
1970 amendment.
"Prior to the 1970 amendment only federal district court judges were allowed to
authorize 3006A(e) services. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) (1964).
mSection 3006A(e)(2) of the amended Act now specifically provides that counsel may
ask for authorization for payment of expenses of up to one hundred and fifty dollars for
expert services after they have been incurred without any special showing of why counsel did
not seek prior authorization. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3006A(e)(2) (Supp. 1971).
mln studying the procedures for obtaining section 3006A(e) services, the Subcommittee
on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary noted that the district
courts had unanimously included procedures which were burdensome and aggravating to
court appointed attorneys and ultimately operated to discourage their seeking section
3006A(e) services. The subcommittee pointed out:
Thus, we heard of attorneys who suspected their clients of being mentally
disturbed, but had no evidence of this suspicion to present to a judge as a
justification for his authorizing expenditures for psychiatric examinations.
(We are unaware whether the local district court's attitude toward
subsection (e) authorizations was sufficiently hostile to justify these
attorneys' timidity about requesting authorization.). . . Consequently, we
feel that the bar should be bold in seeking subsection (e) authorizations,
and the bench should be tolerant in entertaining and relatively generous in
granting them.
SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 90TH
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the previous three hundred dollar limit for services of an unusual nature. 5
It should also be noted that the Senate subcommittee report, which was

relied upon heavily as a basis for the 1970 amendment, recommended that
the discretion of the courts concerning expert services should be exercised
more leniently than in the past. The suggested guideline was whether or

not such services appear to be necessary to assist counsel in the
preparation of the indigent's defense.s
It should be pointed out that section 3006A(e) is broad in scope
because it does not limit the use of psychiatric examinations to either a
determination of competency to stand trial or competency at the time of
the offense. The only qualification upon section 3006A(e) is that expert
services be necessary to aid an attorney in providing an adequate defense
CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT

COURTS 220-21 (Comm. Print 1969).
In regard to the parenthetical portion of the above report, it is interesting to note the
transcript from the competency and arraignment hearing for Maret:
MR. FLYNN [Attorney for Defendant]: Your Honor, may I say a
word before we proceed further? We have an informal request from Mr.
Maret that I be relieved as his attorney. I have attempted to talk to him
and I have told him by writing that you control the appointment. I wish to
renew that as a formal motion.
THE COURT: Well, I can tell you this, I will not relieve you from the
appointment and I will not appoint whom Mr. Maret wants. You can
suffer with him just like I am going to suffer with him.
DEFENDANT MARET: We will all three suffer.
THE COURT: That is right, we will all suffer together. Now Mr.
Maret, do you have any further testimony you want to offer in this matter
as to your competency to stand trial?
DEFENDANT MARET: I would like to know what the ruling was at
the Medical Center.
THE COURT: They said that you are just as sound as a dollar and
ready to go.
DEFENDANT MARET: What was their ruling as to my competency
at the time before the commission?
THE COURT: They said you were competent then, too. Have you got
any further testimony you want to offer?
MR. FLYNN: I will renew my written motion to this extent. I would
like to have a copy of the evidence found by the Medical Center sent to Dr.
Bergman so he can evaluate it for my benefit so that I know I am on a
sound basis.
THE COURT: Well, I don't know Mr. Bergman from Adam's off ox
and your motion is denied.
Record No. 66 Cr. 178, at 2-3, United States v. Maret, 433 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1970).
-18 U.S.C.A. § 3006A(e)(3) (Supp. 1971).
"SUBCOMM.

ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,

90TH CONG., 2D SESs., REPORT ON THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT
COURTS 210-11 (Comm. Print 1969).
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for an indigent defendant.57 By contrast, section 4244 was enacted as a
means to enable the court to determine if a defendant is competent to
stand trial, 58 and the scope of the examination is limited to that question
only.59 Findings relevant to a defense of a lack of criminal responsibility
may be revealed by the examination, but this is not its primary purpose. 0
In addition, a Senate subcommittee report states that the granting of a
section 4244 examination or its results should not prevent the
authorization of section 3006A(e) services. 61 Furthermore, since the
Criminal Justice Act was enacted several years after section 4244,62 this
subsequent legislation should prevail over the prior enactment if any
inconsistencies arise in their application.Y Thus it would seem that a
previous section 4244 examination should not be the basis of a refusal to
grant a defendant the use of expert services under section 3006A(e).
The Maret decision would appear to be a pronouncement by the
Eighth Circuit that their holding in Schultz regarding section 3006A(e)
psychiatric examinations may not be used for "technical and delaying
purposes."" In making this pronouncement, the court seemed to turn
away from the trend of statutory5 and case law" in denying the defendant
and independent psychiatric examination at government expense to aid the
defendant in preparing a defense of insanity at the time of the offense. The
court treated Maret's request for an independent examination merely as a
5See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
-"Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366, 367 (1956); Tienter v. Harris, 222 F. Supp.
920 (W.D. Mo. 1963).
"Notes 24 and 27 and accompanying text supra;see UnitedStates v. Albright, 388 F.2d
719,722 (8th Cir. 1968).
'SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
90TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT
COURTS 216 (Comm. Print 1969).
"Id.
'Section 4244 was codified in its present form in 1949.
"See generally Great N. Ry. v. United States, 315 U.S. 262, 277 (1942); United States
v. Bowling, 256 U.S. 484,487,489-90 (1921); Barrett v. United States, 169 U.S. 218 (1898);
Koshkonong v. Burton, 104 U.S. 668 (1881); Farmers' & Mechanics' Nat'l Bank v.
Dearing, 91 U.S. 29 (1875).
"433 F.2d at 1069.
-18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) (1964), as amended 18 U.S.C.A. § 3006A(e) (Supp. 1971);
notes 51-56 and accompanying text supra.
"See generally United States v. Schultz, 431 F.2d 907 (8th Cir. 1970); United States v.
Albright, 388 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1968); Alexander v. United States, 380 F.2d 33 (8th Cir.
1967); Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1967), vacated, 392 U.S. 651 (1968).
Furthermore, the equal protection clause insures that defendants in criminal proceedings will
not be at a disadvantage simply because they do not have the funds necessary to hire counsel
who possess the requisite skill and knowledge to present their defenses properly before the
court. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45, 68-69 (1932).
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request for a repeat examination under section 4244.67 Drawing on the fact

that the section 4244 examination reports on Maret's competency to stand
trial gave no indication that he lacked criminal responsibility in
committing the crime,' the court ruled that the defendant was properly
denied an independent examination since he failed to plead insanity at the
time of the offense. 9 The court based this holding in part on the intent of
Congress as manifested in section 4244. 7 0 However, this reasoning seems
to contradict the intent of Congress under the Criminal Justice Act which
indicates that independent psychiatric examinations should be granted
when they are necessary for the defendant to adequately prepare his
defense. 7' The Maret court's first alternative requirement, that a
defendant wait until the commencement of his trial to begin preparing the
defense of a lack of criminal responsibility, 72 is not only impractical, but
appears to be inconsistent with the purpose of the Act. Such a rule would
cause delay because in many cases the trial would have to be adjourned for
a period sufficient for a psychiatric examination to be performed.
It is also difficult to accept the reasoning behind the second alternative
requirement, that the defendant plead insanity during the pretrial period in
order to secure an independent examination of his criminal
responsibility. 73 The intended purpose of granting a motion for an
independent psychiatric examination is to provide the indigent's counsel,
who is not an expert in psychiatric matters, the knowledge necessary to
determine if a defense of lack of criminal responsibility is tenable, and to
help prepare the defense if it is found to be so.Y If the defendant is required
to plead the defense of insanity to determine whether it is viable, and the
examination shows that he is sane, then the defendant has been forced to
plead a defense he cannot use. It appears unreasonable to make the
granting of such a motion dependent upon the technicality as to when the
defense of insanity is pleaded.
The ultimate effect of the Maret decision is the placement of a
constraining influence upon the trend of decisions and legislation
reflecting the attitude that independent psychiatric examinations under
section 3005A(e) should be made more readily available to indigent
at 1067-68.
uNote 9 and accompanying text supra.
17433 F.2d

"1433 F.2d at 1076.
7433 F.2d at 1067. It is not immediately clear that the court in Maret is referring to the
Congressional intent behind section 4244. However, by citing to Hall v. United States, 410
F.2d 653 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 970 (1969), the court indicated that it is referring
to repeated section 4244 examinations involved in that case. 433 F.2d at 1067.
7
Notes 51-56 and accompanying text supra.
n433 F.2d at 1069.
"433 F.2d at 1067, 1068-69.
7
Note 54 supra.
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defendants. In view of the fact that indigent criminal defendants have an
established right to be represented by counsel, it appears inconsistent to
refuse to acknowledge that such counsel will need the proper tools with
which to effect such representation. However, the decision in Maret stems
largely from the district and circuit courts' refusal to treat the motion for
an independent psychiatric examination under section 3006A(e) on its
own merits, rather than in conjunction with the prior section 4244
examinations. Until Congress supplies further guidance with respect to
the proper application of these sections, courts may be expected to
experience continued difficulty in ruling upon a section 3006A(e) motion
which has been preceded by a section 4244 examination.
EUGENE

M.

ELLIOTT, JR.

